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1. Introduction 
In their (1983) paper Brander and Spencer study the effect of imposing a tariff, 
or snbsidy, in a model where two domestic monopolies sell in a third market after 
having invested in a cost-saving technology in a previous stage. They show that 
for a homogenous goods industry, under free trade, firms overinvest in the cost 
saving technology. Further, if governments have the possibility of unilaterally (or 
bilaterally) subsidizing/taxing R&D, they choose to subsidize R&D. If, however, 
governments have the possibility of subsidizing/taxing both output and R&D, 
they tax R&D and subsidize output. An underlying assumption in their paper 
is that governments credibly commit to a policy action before firms choose their 
strategic variables l . 
The question of whether the choice of the optimal policy instrument is sensi-
tive to the nature of market competition was addressed by Eaton and Grossman 
(1986): Using a model of conjectures they show that, under Bertrand competi-
tion, the optimal policy instrument is a tax on exports. However, under Cournot 
competition (as in Spencer and Brander (1993)) subsidies on exports are optimal. 
Eaton and Grossman (1986) do not explicitly model firm investment in R&D, or 
product differentiation, and assume that firms set output or prices taking subsidies 
and taxes as given. 
The sensitivity of cost saving R&D to the choice of market competition and 
degree of product differentiation was shown by Bester and Petrakis (1993). In a 
differentiated goods industry firms invest in cost-reducing R&D before engaging 
in market competition. They show that investment in R&D not only depends 
on the degree of product substitutability, but also on the assnmption on the 
nature of market competition (i.e., whether firms compete in prices or quantities). 
If the degree of product substitution is high, there are stronger incentives to 
invest in R&D under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. For 
low good substitutability, the result is reversed. They further show that, unlike 
the homogeneous good Spencer and Brander's (1993) results, underinvestment 
in R&D is obtained under both Cournot and Bertrand competition if the goods 
are poor substitutes. They do not, however, analyze incentives to invest in R&D 
nuder strategic trade policy instruments. 
lSpencer and Brander (1983) further argue that it is reasonable to assume that governments 
commit and that the governments act in this leadership role (that is, moves first) is fairly natural, 
pp. 711,Section 4. 
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Besides Brander and Spencer the effect of trade policy instruments on R&D 
expenditure has been studied by Reitzes (1991) and Cabral, Kujal and Petrakis 
(1998). Reitzes (1991) used a Cournot duopoly model to study firm incentives 
to invest in cost-reducing technology under quantity restrictions. Firms invest in 
R&D initially and then compete in quantities. The introduction of a Voluntary 
Export Restraint (or a quota) at the free trade production level results in both 
the domestic and the foreign firms choosing lower levels of cost reducing R&D 
than they would under free trade.2 
Following Reitzes (1991) Cabral et a1. (1998) examine the effect of imposing 
a VER (or a quota) under Bertrand competition. They find that under Bertrand 
competition Reitzes's (1991) results are only partially reversed. Similar to the 
Cournot competition case, the domestic firm invests less in R&D relatively to the 
free trade case. The foreign firm, however, invests more in R&D than under free 
trade. 3 
Besides the sensitivity of R&D to the degree of product differentiation and the 
nature of product market competition, another related, and important, issue that 
has received some attention is the role of commitment in the choice of trade policy 
instruments4 . Recent work by many5 has shown that the ability of a government to 
2In the presence of a quota, domestic investment in R&D declines because the strategic 
advantage of R&D vanishes for the domestic firm - with the quota, the domestic firm becomes a 
monopolist on the residual demand and chooses the cost minimizing level of R&D expenditures. 
The foreign firm, constrained by the quota, also has less incentives to invest in R&D. Reitzes 
(1991) also shows that a quota and a tariff may often produce opposite effects on domestic R&D 
since while a tariff preserves the strategic link between R&D and foreign output, a quota does 
not. 
3This result is explained by the fact that under Bertrand competition foreign investment in 
R&D has a negative (indirect) strategic effect on foreign firms' profits: higher foreign invest-
ment in R&D makes the domestic firm lower its price which in turn results in lower prices and 
profits for the foreign firm. This makes the foreign firm "underinvest" in R&D (under Cournot 
competition this indirect strategic effect is of the opposite sign and consequently the firm over-
invests in R&D). With the imposition of the quota the negative strategic effect disappears and 
investment in R&D necessarily increases for the constrained case. Contrarily, the domestic firm 
invests less in R&D as it faces lesser competition from the foreign firm (this effect is similar to 
the one present in Reitzes' (1991) model). 
4 As Brander (1995) notes, "An intriguing but under-appreciated aspect of trade policy analy-
sis is the crucial importance of the timing of decisions." (p.1418). 
5See Carmichael (1987), Leahy and Neary (1994, 1996, 1999) and Goldberg (1995) for hori-
zontally differentiated markets, and Herguera, Kujal and Petrakis (1997) for vertically differen-
tiated industries. 
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commit to a policy is relevant for the choice of trade policy outcomes. Carmichael 
(1987) and Herguera, Kujal and Petrakis (1997) show that if firms know that the 
subsidy level depends on their choice of price or quality, firms respond optimally 
and choose the maximum price, or quality. In this scenario, domestic welfare is 
lower than if the government moves first and commits to a given subsidy level. 
However, in the Herguera et al. (1997) framework, where the foreign firm sells in 
the domestic market, non-committal to a tariff results in higher domestic welfare 
than under free trade due to the possibility of quality switching between the high-, 
and low-, quality firms. Leahy and Neary (1996, 1997, 1999) show that domestic 
welfare under commitment is always higher if the government can commit to an 
R&D subsidy.6 Besides the Herguera et al. result that welfare improves when the 
government does not commit to a tariff, a common theme in all of these papers 
is that government commitment to a subsidy is welfare improving. 
The above results indicate that assumptions both on the nature of market 
competition, the degree of product differentiation, and the role of commitment are 
crucial in determining policy outcomes. Further, the policy instrument reversal 
suggested by Eaton and Grossman (1986) has put in doubt the robustness of the 
existing models. 7 It thus makes sense that extensions of the existing models are 
considered to see whether the policy reversal result in Eaton and Grossman is still 
observed. 
In this paper, we study the choice of strategic trade policy instruments when 
firms invest in R&D and then compete in prices or in quantities. We use this 
model as it captures an important characteristic of oligopolistic markets. That is, 
in a stage prior to market competition firms invest in a strategic variable (the level 
of which cannot be altered in the market competition stage). In our case, firms 
first commit to a level of R&D expenditure before they compete in the market 
stage. Given that (i) firm incentives to invest in R&D depends on the nature 
of product market competition and on the degree of substitutability between the 
goods, (ii) quotas lead only to a partial reversal of results between Cournot and 
Bertrand competition when one considers a differentiated goods industry with 
firm investment in R&D, and that, (iii) the role of commitment is important in 
6By committing to an R&D subsidy the government decreases the R&D expenditure of the 
foreign firm. Thus, it decreases the loss in the domestic firm's market share due to the foreign 
firm's overinvestment in R&D. 
7In his critique of Strategic Trade Policy models Grossman (1988) questions the robustness 
of these models as the results are sensitive to the nature of product market competition. 
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determining policy outcomes, we use the Bester and Petrakis (1993) differentiated 
goods model, where firms invest in R&D before the market competition stage. 
We compare both Bertrand and Cournot market competition equilibria under the 
following policy instruments: 
(i) Credible unilateral and bilateral subsidies to R&D. 
(ii) Credible unilateral and bilateral subsidies to output. 
(iii) Non-credilbe unilateral and bilateral subsidies to output.8 
(iv) Credible unilateral and bilateral subsidies to both R&D and output. 
We show that, if governments commit to a policy before the firms choose 
R&D, unilateral and bilateral subsidies to R&D are positive both under Cournot 
and Bertrand competition. Investment in innovation increases for the subsidized 
firm relative to free trade regardless of the nature of market competition. World 
output also increases both for unilateral and bilateral R&D subsidies. Further, 
when both governments subsidize output we find that they choose a positive 
subsidy on output both under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, unlike 
Eaton and Grossman's (1986) result9 . However, under non-credibility, our results 
change: governments subsidize under Cournot competition and tax exports under 
Bertrand competition. The Eaton and Grossman's (1986) policy reversal result is 
obtained when the government does not commit to a trade policy. This highlights 
the role of the commitment in the choice of trade policy instruments. We further 
show that in a game where governments choose to, or not to, commit to a policy, 
unilaterally or bilaterally, the dominant strategy equilibria is that none chooses 
the non-commitment policy. Free trade is preferred over non-committal always. 
Thus, the policy reversal result, even though observed under price competition 
and non-committal, is never an equilibrium policy choice in our model. 
Further, if the government has to choose between subsidizing R&D or output, 
it subsidizes R&D for low levels of product substitutability and output for higher 
levels of substitutability under Bertrand competition. If the governments choose 
to snbsidize both R&D and output then under Bertrand competition governments 
will subsidize both, however, under Cournot competition R&D is taxed and output 
subsidized (as in Spencer and Brander (1983)). 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the model is laid out and the 
8Given that R&D costs are sunk in our model and that firms invest in cost reducing innovation 
prior to the market competition stage, allowing for the government to move after the choice of 
R&D does not change any of the results. 
9It should be noted that Eaton and Grossman (1986) assume government commitment. 
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free-trade results are derived. In Section 3 and 4 R&D and production subsidies 
are studied, respectively (both the unilateral and the bilateral subsidy cases are 
analyzed). In Section 5 the issue of non-credible policies are analyzed. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. The model under Free 'frade 
We use a third-country model to consider the case of two firms, located in two 
different countries, that produce a differentiated good which they sell in a third 
country. There is a competitive numeraire sector. The two firms operate under 
constant returns to scale and initially have the same marginal costs of produc-
tion c. Firms can invest in a cost saving technology prior to engaging in market 
competition and are able to reduce its marginal cost by ~ by spending ~2 • Both 
firms face the following symmetric demand functions lO: 
(2.1) 
r measures the degree of product differentiation. As r approaches zero each 
firm becomes a local monopolist and as r approaches one, goods become almost 
perfect substitutes. To avoid corner solutions in the Bertrand game we limit our 
attention to the cases where r :S 0.827891. 
Firms play a two-stage game. In stage one, firms simultaneously decide how 
mnch to invest in cost saving R&D (~i). In stage two, given the reduced unit cost, 
firms simultaneously compete in prices, or quantities. In this context, investment 
in R&D has a commitment value, as firms can use R&D strategically to improve 
their position in the subsequent market competition stage. The problem is solved 
using sub-game perfect equiIibria. 
,;Ve analyze both the quantity competition and the price competition cases. 
lOThese are the demand functions of a consumer with utlity U(Xi,Xj) = a(xi + Xj) -
(x"+x 2 +2,Xi X.·). . .. . . • 
, 12 J +m WIth m representlllg money, followlllg DDot (1979). Resultlllg lllverse demand 
is Pi = a - Xi - "IXj. 
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2.1. Cournot competition 
2.1.1. The output choice stage 
Firm i chooses Xi to maximize profits which, given inverse demand (Pi = a - Xi -
",(Xj) and reduced unit cost (c -.6.), are: 
(2.2) 
Pj and .6.i are taken as given. Each firm's reaction function is thus derived: 
(2.3) 
The intersection of the two reaction functions gives us the equilibrium quan-
t.it.ies (ql, q2), each chosen given t.he output of the other firm. The equilibrium 
out.put and profits are respectively: 
(2.4) 
and 
(2.5) 
2.1.2. the R&D stage 
Firm i, given .6.j ,chooses .6.i to maximize its profits (defined above). First-order 
conditions and symmetry allow us to derive optimal R&D spending, output and 
price for each firm: 
.6.*= 4(a-c) 
(4 + 4"'( - 2"'(2 - "'(3)' (2.6) 
* (a - c)( 4 - "'(2) 
X - -~-~--.-:...-.:.--
- (4 + 4"'( - 2"'(2 - ",(3) , (2.7) 
* a"'(2-c(4-"'(2)(1+"'()) 
P = ( -4 - 4"'( + 2"'(2 + ",(3) . (2.8) 
Firms' profits are then given by 
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(2.9) 
One should note that a firm has more incentive to invest in cost-reducing 
R&D under CoufIlot competition than under a pure cost-minimizing strategy, 
since there is a positive strategic effect of R&D on profits. 
2.2. Bertrand competition 
2.2.1. The price choice stage 
Firm i chooses Pi so as to maximize profits: 
(2.10) 
Pj and 6.i are taken as given. This defines each firm's reaction function: 
(2.11 ) 
Once more, the intersection of the two reaction functions determines the equi-
librium prices (Pl, P2), each chosen given the price of the other firm. The equilib-
rium prices and profits are: 
(2.12) 
and 
(2.13) 
The R&D stage Firm i, given D.j,chooses D.i to maximize its profits (defined 
above). From the first-order conditions and symmetry we obtain optimal R&D 
spending, output and price for each firm: 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
9 
p* = _1_ [a(l-)') + c - 6.*]. 
2-), 
Firms' profits are then given by 
* _ 8 - 16)'2 + 7)'4 - )'6 ( )2 
7f - Dlb)2 a - c . 
vVhere, D1b) = (1 + )')(2 - ')')(4 _),2) - 2(2 _),2). 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
It should be noted that a firm has less incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D 
under price competition than under a pure cost-minimizing strategy, since there 
is a negative strategic effect of R&D on profits - as a response to firm i's reduction 
of unit costs, its rival decreases its price, thus shifting i's demand inwards. Firm 
i then has to reduce its price in order to sell the same output. By lowering its 
R&D expenditures beyond the cost minimizing level, a firm can commit to softer 
competition in the subsequent market game. 
It can now be clearly seen that firms invest more in R&D under Cournot com-
petition than under Bertrand competition. Further, due to the competitive nature 
of the Bertrand game, output under Bertrand competition is greater than under 
Conrnot competition. Domestic welfare is higher under Bertrand competition for 
most values of J'. Only when), is high enough b > .78445), i.e. the goods are 
close substitutes, is domestic welfare under Cournot competition higher. This is 
t.he Best.er and Petrakis (1993) result that welfare does not only depend on the 
nature of competition but also of the degree of product differentiation. 
3. Optimal R&D subsidies 
In this section we analyze the effect of imposing optimal R&D subsidies upon 
the firms. Our motivations for the analysis of R&D subsidies is the same as in 
Spencer and Brander (1983). That is, R&D subsidies are permitted under the 
rulings of the WTO. We also thus view this as being the more relevant case in our 
model. We assume that the government can credibly commit to a policy actionll . 
The game is modelled as follows: Governments first choose and announce their 
policy actions12. After this announcement, firms decide how much to invest in 
llThe possibility of non-credibility is analyzed in section 5. 
12Some authors justify this modelling by arguing that governments are not playing strategies 
actively in the markets. They tend to commit to policy actions before the market participants. 
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cost reducing R&D. They then proceed to compete in prices or in quantities in 
the final stage of the game. 
\Ve consider unilateral subsidies and bilateral subsidies towards R&D. We 
analyze both the cases of Cournot competition and Bertrand competition. 
3.1. Cournot competition 
3.1.1. Unilateral R&D subsidies 
We show that the incentive to unilaterally subsidize R&D in fact depends on the 
degree of product substitutability. Country 1 subsidizes R&D only if the degree of 
substitutability between the goods is low (i.e. low),). For higher levels of product 
substitutability domestic welfare of the subsidizing country is negative and hence 
it never unilaterally subsidizes R&D. Further, investment in R&D is greater than 
free trade only when market competition is tougher (i.e low),), however, the 
opposite is true for the non-subsidized firm. As in Spencer and Brander (1983) 
total domestic welfare for the subsidizing country is greater than under free trade 
while the contrary true for the non-subsidizing country. 
Market competition stage We initially assume that only country 1 subsi-
dizes R&D. A fraction Zl of firm l's expenditures on R&D is subsidized by the 
government. The problem is then no longer symmetric. Firm 1 and firm 2 again 
maximize profits: 
(3.1 ) 
(3.2) 
From the first order condition we get the reaction functions for firm i, i, j = 1, 2, 
that gives us the equilibrium outputs for firm i, i, j = 1,2, 
(3.3) 
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The R&D stage: Given the equilibrium outputs the firms maximize their prof-
its with respect to .6.i . From the first order conditions we get, 
.6. _ 4[(a - c)(2 - ')') - ~2')')) 
1 - (-4 + ')'2)2(1 - ((-4!1'2)2) - Z1) 
.6. _ 4(a(2 - ')') - c(2 - ')') - ~l"Y) 
2 - (8 - 8')'22 + ')'4) 
This gives us the equilibrium R&D investment for each firm, 
.6.~ = 4(a - c)(4 - 4')' - 2')'2 + ,),3) 
(16 + 12')'4(1- Zl) - ,),6(1 - Zl) - 32z1 + 8')'2(5z1 - 4)) (3.4) 
~* _ (4(a - c)(4 - 4')'(1- Zl) - 2')'2(1- Zl) + ,),3(1- Zl) - 8z1)) (3.5) 
2 - (16 + 12')'4(1 - Zl) - ,),6(1 - Zl) - 32z1 + 8')'2(5z1 - 4)) 
The two equations above can be solved for the optimal subsidy, z;, and total 
welfare for both countries can be derived: 
* 2')'2 
Zl = (8 - 6')'2 + ')'4) (3.6) 
TW* = (4 - 4')' - 2')'2 + ,),3)2 
1 32 - 96')'2 + 72')'4 - 16')'6 + ')'8 (3.7) 
TW.* = (8 - 8')'2 + ')'4)( -8 + 8')' + 12')'2 - 8')'3 - 2')'4 + ,),5)2 
2 32 - 96')'2 + 72')'4 - 16')'6 + ')'8 (3.8) 
It can be seen that the optimal subsidy is an increasing function of ')' and 
reaches its maximum when,), = 1. The subsidy is zero when firm 1 has a monopoly 
on the production of the good (')' = 0) and reaches its maximum as the market 
becomes increasingly competitive. Welfare for country 1 is positive if')' is low, i.e., 
when goods are (high) imperfect substitutes. It becomes negative when goods are 
dose substitutes. This is because the optimal subsidy is an increasing function of 
')'. Country 1 thus has no incentive to unilaterally subsidize R&D when market 
competition is high. For a high degree of product substitution, total welfare is 
greater than under free trade for country 1, while it is lower for country 2. 
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Innovation expenditures depend upon the degree of product differentiation and 
on whom receives the subsidy. Firm 1 (the subsidized firm) invests more in R&D 
relative to free trade when the degree of product differentiation is greater. The 
opposite applies for the other firm. 
3.1.2. Bilateral R&D Subsidies 
Market competition stage Suppose now that each country chooses to sub-
sidize R&D, paying a fraction Zi of firm i's R&D expenditures. Profit functions 
change to include an extra term. (1 - Zi) multiplies firm i's R&D expenditures. 
Once more, profit maximization yields the reaction functions: 
Equilibrium output levels are then derived: 
(3.9) 
The R&D stage Substituting the equilibrium outputs into profits, maximizing 
with respect to ~i and solving the first-order condition, we obtain: 
_ 4(a(2 -,) - c(2 -,) - ~j,) ~i - (( 2)2( 8 )). 
-4 +, 1 - (_4+),2)2 - Zi 
The equilibrium level of innovation expenditures, il, for both the firms is then 
derived: 
il* = (4(a - c)(4 - 4,(1- Zj) - 2,2(1 - Zj) + ,3(1 - Zj) - 8zj )) 
2 D 1(!) . (3.10) 
where, D1(!) = (12,4(1- zi)(l- Zj) - ,6(1_ zi)(l- Zj) + 16(1- 2zi)(1- 2zj)-
8,2(4 - 5zj - zi(5 - 6zj ))). 
Substituting the equilibrium cost reduction expenditures in profits and maxi-
mizing with respect to Zi we can next solve for the subsidies: 
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The solution to the equilibrium subsidies is non-unique. Two values are obtained 
for both firm i and firm j. We choose the relevant subsidy as the one which results 
in a greater domestic welfare level13 . 
Plotting the subsidy as a function of the degree of product differentiation it 
can be seen that both the countries subsidize the good only for low values of "( 
(S; .5878). Looking at total welfare, it can be seen that if both the countries 
choose to subsidize they choose the following optimal subsidy:14 
Plotting Zi and Z2 as a function of "( it is seen that the subsidies are positive only 
for gamma "( S; .5878. 
Discussion: As in Spencer and Brander (1983), we find that optimal R&D 
subsidies are positive when both the countries choose subsidies. Even though 
jointly suboptimal both the countries choose to subsidize due to the prisoners' 
dilemma nature of the subsidy game. Total welfare under bilateral R&D subsidies 
is lower than under free trade for both the countries. However, given that under 
unilateral subsidies welfare is greater for the subsidizing country and lower for the 
other country, both the countries choose to subsidize R&D. This results in lower 
domestic welfare for both the countries. Both firms invest more in R&D under 
bilateral subsidies and world output increases relative to free trade. 
3.2. Bertrand competition 
As before the decision to unilaterally subsidize R&D depends on the degree of 
product substitutability. Contrary to Cournot competition unilateral subsidies are 
always positive for all degrees of product substitution. However, the subsidizing 
country only chooses to subsidize only for lower degrees of product substitution 
(.\ S; .6739). For higher degrees of .\ domestic welfare is negative. As in Cournot 
competition domestic welfare of the subsidizing (non-subsidizing) country is higher 
(lower) than under free trade. In the case of price competition investment in R&D 
is only higher than free trade only the degree of product substitution is low. 
13We assume that any rational government will choose a subsidy that maximizes total welfare. 
14For the other root, total welfare is negative for both countries. 
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3.2.1. Unilateral R&D subsidies 
As before, we assume that it is firm 1 that receives the subsidy. In this case, 
equilibrium prices for firm i = 1,2 are: 
(3.ll) 
Substituting equilibrium prices into profits and maximizing in order to .6.i we 
obtain equilibrium investment levels in cost-saving innovation for both countries: 
2( a - c)( -8 + 14"(2 - 7"(4 + ,,(6). 
(-4 + "(2(4 - 6z1) - (4"( - "(3 - "(4)( -1 + zd + 8z1 ) 
D2b) (3.13) 
Where, D 2 ( "() = "(2(240 - 44Sz1) +,,(6(236 - 336z1) +,,(10(14 -16zd +"(12( -1 + 
Zl) + 64( -1 + 2z1 ) + S"(4( -44 + 71z1) + "(8 ( -SI + 103z1 ). Finally, by substituting 
the equilibrium values of 6.i we can solve for the equilibrium R&D subsidy, R&D 
spending, output, and welfare. 
6.* _ 2(S -14"(2 + 7"(4 - ,,(6) NI b) 
2 - D3 ("() 
(-1 + "()2(2 + "()3. 
(64 + 32"( - 224"(2 - 4S,,(3 + 272"(4 - 12"(5 - 140"(6 + 26"(7 + 33"(8 _ 9"(9 _ 3"(10 + "(11) 
D 3 ("() 
15 
(128 - 448,2 + 552,4 - 280,6 + 33,8 + 23,10 - 9,12 + ,14)N2(r) 
TW2 = D3(r) 
Where, D3(r) = 512-2816,2+6688,4_8832,6+6928,8_3368,1°+1031,12-
195,14 + 21,16 - ,18, NI (,) = (-32 + 32, + 88,2 - 72,3 - 96,4 + 44,5 + 48,6 -
11,7 - 11,8 + ,9 + ,lO)and N2(r) = (-256 + 256, + 864,2 - 736,3 - 1240,4 + 
744,5 + 952,6 - 380,7 - 424,8 + 107,9 + 111,10 _ 16,11 _ 16,12 + ,13 + ,14). 
Note t.hat. all t.he above expressions are a function of t.he degree of product 
different.iation ,. Comparing these results to the case of free trade it can be 
seen that t.he output of the firm that receives the subsidy is less (more) than the 
output under free trade when the degree of product differentiation is low (high). 
As markets get competitive a R&D subsidy in fact results in a lower level of 
output. However, the converse is true for firm 2 (the non subsidy-recipient). 
Innovation expenditures for the subsidized firm are greater than under free 
trade when the goods are not close substitutes. Under uniltateral subsidies, firm-
2 decreases its R&D expenditures relat.ively to free trade. Further, unilateral 
subsidies are positive for all,. Domestic welfare is higher than under free trade 
when goods are imperfect substitutes (near monopolies at home). Welfare of the 
non-subsidizing country is always less than under free trade. 
3.2.2. Bilateral R&D Subsidies 
Price competition stage The problem of the firm is the same as in section 
2.2 for the price selection stage. When both firms receive a subsidy of Zi ~2 , profit 
maximization with relation to R&D expenditures yields: 
16 
Where, D4 (J) = (,8(-1 + zi)(-l + Zj) + 16(-1 + 2zd(-1 + 2zj) + ,6(-9 + 
zi(1l-13zj ) + llzj) -8,2(6-9zj +Zi( -9+14zj )) +,4(32 -44zj +Zi( -44+60zj )). 
Substituting /:).i in total welfare we then solve for the equilibrium subsidy for each 
firm. This gives us the two roots (note we remove the subscripts as the roots are 
symmetric) , 
(3.15) 
where, 
8 = )(4 - 20,2 + 21,4 - 6,6 + ,8. 
Given the two solutions, we assume that the government selects the dominating 
one, i.e. the one that yields a greater domestic welfare level. This then gives us 
the equilibrium expenditure on R&D, output and total welfare for firm i, i,j = 
1,2(i;j): 
(3.17) 
where N3 (J) = 22,8 + 10,9 - 2,10 _,11 + 16(2 + 8) - 40,2(4 + 8) -,7(41 + 
8) - 2,6(50 + 8) + 8,4(27 + 28) - 2,3(18 + 78) + ,5(76 + 78) and, D5(J) = (1 + 
,) (_12,10+,12+ 16(2+8)+,8(67 +8)-3,6(68+38)-8,2(24+78)+,4(324+348)). 
It can be seen that both governments choose to subsidize R&D and that in-
vestment in cost reducing innovation is greater than under free trade. The total 
output sold in the market increases relatively to the free trade case. Under price 
competition and when goods are imperfect substitutes, total welfare is lower rel-
atively to free trade. However, under bilateral R&D subsidies, profits are higher 
for both firms. 
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3.2.3. Discussion: 
Under Bertrand competition we also get the classic prisoners' dilemma. The 
unilaterally subsidizing country has a higher level of welfare than under free trade. 
Since the non-subsidizing country's welfare decreases, both the countries end up 
deciding to subsidize R&D. This occurs in spite of the fact that total welfare 
for both the countries is lower than under free trade. Comparing these results 
with the Cournot competition case, we see that in the Cournot case 6. is larger 
(smaller) for'Y < (» 0.426, output is lower and total welfare is higher (but still 
lower that in the free trade situation, as mentioned before). Further note that 
under Bertrand competition total output with bilateral subsidies is higher than 
nnder unilateral subsidies. Compared to Cournot competition total world output 
is higher under Bertrand competition. 
Note, however, that the qualitative policy results do not change from Bertrand 
to Conrnot competition. That is, the optimal subsidy to R&D is always positive. 
We do not obtain the reversal of policy instruments as do Eaton and Grossman 
(1986). In our model in the presence of government commitment R&D subsidy is 
always positive. 
Further, in our model investment in R&D has a commitment value. Firms 
can strategically commit to a cost saving investment, thereby altering the best 
response of the othe! firm in the market competition stage. If a government 
commits to a policy before the firms invest in a cost saving technology, then the 
firm decision to invest in the cost saving decision enters the governments objective 
function. 
Another interesting result coming out of our analysis is that total welfare is 
greater under R&D subsidies than under output subsidies for low levels of product 
substitution (A E [0, .565]) and the contrary is true for higher levels of product 
substitution (A E [.565, .67]). Thus, governments would choose to subsidize R&D 
over output for low levels of product substitution and output for higher levels 
of product substitution. This further emphasizes the result that the choice to 
subsidize R&D, or output, will also depend on the degree of product substitution 
and not only the nature of market competition. 
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4. Output subsidies under commitment 
If the output subsidy is unilaterally chosen, the subsidizing country makes higher 
profits than if it does not subsidize output. Given the prisoners dilemma nature 
of the policy instrument choice, both the countries end up subsidizing output. 
The equilibrium outcome of the subsidy choice game is both cOlmtries choosing 
to subsidize. Thus, we only present the results for the bilateral subsidy case for 
both, Cournot and Bertrand competition. 
4.1. Bilateral output subsidy 
4.1.1. Cournot competition 
Adding the subsidy term to the profit function from the first order conditions we 
can easily solve for output, Xi. 
( 4.1) 
Substituting Xi into the profits the expenditure on R&D, .6.i ,is obtained, 
.6.
i 
= 4[(a - c)(4 - 4,- 2,2 + ,3) + (4 - 2,2)Si -,(4 _,2)Sj]. (4.2) 
16 - 32,2 + 12,4 _,6 
Substituting .6. i into the profits and maximizing total welfare the equilibrium 
subsidy, si,is obtained, 
(4.3) 
where, D 6 (,) = 64 + 64,- 128,2 - 64,3 + 72,4 + 20,5 - 16,6 - 2,7 + ,8 
Equilibrium production, innovation and welfare levels are, 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
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* 2 (4 - ('2)2(64 - 224('2 + 216('4 - 88('6 + 16('8 - ('10 
Wi = (a - c) D
6
((')2 . (4.6) 
We set the equilibrium profits (ni) equal to zero in order to obtain the value 
of (' below which the analysis of the profits and welfare is relevant. We restrict 
our attention to these (' values only. In this relevant range, we find that the 
equilibrium subsidy is always positive15 . Total welfare is, however, maximized 
when (' = O. Total world output increases due to the bilateral subsidy. 
4.1.2. Bertrand competition 
Adding the subsidy term to the profit function from the first order conditions we 
can easily solve for the price, Pi. 
Substituting pi into the profits the expenditure on R&D , ~i,is obtained, 
~~ = 2(2 - (,?[(2 - ('2? - ('(4 - ('2)] (a - c) + 81(2 - ('2)2 - 82,(4 _ ,2). 
, 16 - 48,2 + 32,4 - 9('6 +,8 
Substituting .6.i into the profits and writing the total welfare the subsidy, 8i, 
that maximizes total welfare is obtained, 
where D7 ( (') = 64 + 64, - 160,2 - 96('3 + 104('4 + 52('5 - 28('6 - 12,7 + 3('8 + ('9 
Equilibrium output, innovation and welfare are respectively given by the fol-
lowing expressions: 
I5It should be noted that the government only chooses a tax instead of a subsidy for very 
high values of product substitution. However, since for these values firm profits are negative, 
firms do not enter the market. 
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W.* = ( _ )22(8 - 6'l + /,4)2(16 - 56/,2 + 38/,4 - 1O/,6 + /,8 
t a c D
7
(!')2 
Once more, setting equilibrium profits, 11';, equal to zero (and plotting) we 
obtain the relevant /' for which the analysis of the profits and welfare is relevant. 
Profits, 11'i, equal zero for /' = .827891. We restrict our attention to these values 
of 'Y only. It is easily seen that the equilibrium subsidy is always positive for all 
'Y( < .827891). However, note that total welfare becomes negative for /' > 0.66659. 
A welfare maximizing government would never choose to subsidize if welfare is 
negative16 . The equilibrium subsidy is always positive in this range also. Firm 
innovation under bilateral output subsidies is greater than under free trade. Total 
world output increases due to the bilateral subsidy. The increase in output is 
greater than observed in the Cournot case. 
5. Non-credible output subsidies 
Under the scenario of non-committal several cases can arise. That is, a country can 
choose lmilaterally not to commit, or both the countries can choose bilaterally not 
to commitP. Thus, the equilibrium of this commit/not-to-commit policy game 
will determine what policies will the governments actually adopt. In the first 
part of this section we first analyze the case of bilateral no-commitment. 18 Then 
finally we discuss the equilibria in the non-commitment game and show that in 
fact non-committal as a strategy is never an equilibrium strategy and if the policy 
choice is non-committal governments always prefer free trade to not committing 
(to a tariff ) in our model. 
In this section we assume that any policy announcement by the government 
is not credible. Hence, the firms will choose their policy actions as if the govern-
ment chooses the policy variable after the firms move. First, the firm invests in 
R.&D. After the firm has chosen its investment in cost reducing innovation the 
government chooses the optimal subsidy/tax announcement. Firms then play the 
16Note that, again the values for which the government chooses a tax instead of a subsidy is 
for very high values of "f. However, as firm profits are negative in this range a firm would not 
enter the industry. 
17 Other cases, such as one country committing and the other not, or that the countries 
choosing policies sequentially, can arise. We do not consider all these cases and leave them for 
a future agenda for research. 
18This enables us to compare our results with Eaton and Grossman (1986). 
21 
market competition game. This only requires us to change the sequence of the 
moves in the first two stages of the game. As we use the sub-game perfect equi-
librium concept this implies that we first solve for the market competition stage, 
the government(s) then chooses its policy action and finally the firms choose their 
R&D expenditure. 
5.1. Bilateral output subsidy 
5.1.1. Cournot competition 
Total welfare is a decreasing function of "( and is zero for "( = 0.630804. Total 
welfare is maximum for "( = O. We focus on "( in the range where total welfare 
is non-negative. Firm incentive to invest in cost reduction is maximum under a 
monopoly and only slightly changes with the degree of product differentiation. 
Under non-credible policies innovation is higher than under credible subsidies and 
higher than under free trade. 
Adding the subsidy term to the profit function, max [Pi - (c - ~i - Si) 1 Xi (Pi, Pj ), 
from the first order conditions we solve for output, Xi. 
(5.1) 
Substituting Xi into the profits we get, 7fi(Xi,~i' Si) = (Xi(~i' Si))2 - ~,the 
policy announcement, Si, by the government is obtained19 , 
Further substituting s; into the first order conditions the expenditure on R&D, 
~; ,is obtained, 
* 8(4-"(2) ~. = -------'----'-'-------
t 32 + 32"( - 56"(2 - 24"(3 + 16"(4 + 2"(5 - "(6 (5.2) 
Given ~; and s; , equilibrium output and welfare are then derived: 
(5.3) 
19 The government decision is independent of firm investment in R&D. 
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w~ = 2(896')'2 - 256 - 720')'4 + 224')'6 - 26')'8 + ,),10) 
, (32 + 32')' - 56')'2 - 24')'3 + 16')'4 + 2')'5 _ ,),6)2 . (5.4) 
These results allow us to write the following propositions: 
Proposition 5.1. Government subsidy increases with the degree of product dif-
ferentiation. The government does not subsidize a domestic monopolist. 
It is easy to see that sr is zero for,), = O. F\lrther, plotting the optimal subsidy 
as a function of')' it is seen that it increases with ')'. 
Proposition 5.2. Firm expenditure in R&D under Cournot competition is greater 
than under free trade. Total output increases and domestic welfare is lower than 
under free trade. Total domestic welfare 
5.1.2. Bertrand competition 
Total welfare is a decreasing function of')' and is zero for,), = .974307. However, 
profits are non-negative only for,), :::; 0.938. Innovation is a decreasing function of 
product differentiation and is maximum under a domestic monopoly. Innovation 
expenditures under Bertrand competition are less than under Cournot competi-
tion under a duopoly. The government taxes exports for all degrees of product 
differentiation in the relevant range. This is the same result as in Eaton and 
Grossman (1986). This suggests that the policy reversal result is more likely to 
be observed when governments cannot commit to a policy. 
Adding the subsidy term to the profit function from the first order conditions 
and after some manipulations we obtain the equilibrium price, subsidy, and total 
welfare. 
~~ = 2(2 - ')')2(4 - 3')'2) 
, -32 - 32')' - 40')'2 - 40')'3 + 14')'4 + 14')'5 _ ')'6 + ')'7' 
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Proposition 5.3. Under time consistent subsidies and price competition the gov-
ernment taxes R&D. Innovation expenditures under Bertrand competition are less 
than under Cournot competition. Total welfare under time consistent tariffs is 
greater than under precommitment subsidies. 
Plotting the subsidy expression it is seen that it is negative for all values 
of product differentiation. Innovation expenditures under time consistent tariffs 
are smaller then under the precommitment (subsidy) equilibria. As firms do not 
overinvest in R&D in the presence of a tariff total welfare is greater under a time 
consistent tariff then under a precommitment subsidy. 
6. Bilateral joint subsidies to R&D and production. 
We only consider the case where the governments simultaneously subsidize R&D 
and ontpnt. 20 We choose to analyze the case where both the announcements are 
credible. If governments can subsidize both R&D and production, we find that 
they will choose to subsidize both R&D and output under Bertrand competition. 
The optimal subsidy on R&D is given by zf, and t.he opt.imal subsidy on output 
is given by s~: 
However, under Cournot competition there is a partial reversal of results with both 
governments choosing to tax R&D while subsidizing output. This extends Spencer 
2°There are other alternatives to this scenario that can be considered, for example, R&D 
subsidies can be analyzed both in the presence, and absence, of government commitment for 
output subsidies. Further, it is not clear if the two governments would bilaterally choose trade 
policy instruments both for production and R&D. 
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and Brander's (1983) result to the case of product differentiation. Subsidies to 
R&D and output are given by zf and si respectively: 
c ,2(a - c) 
s·=----
z 1 + ,_,2 
The reason why this happens is that, unlike the Bertrand case, overinvestment 
in R&D is observed under Cournot competition. As a result, both governments 
find it in their incentive to tax R&D under Cournot competition. 
7. Conclusion 
When firms in a differentiated industry invest in cost reducing R&D and govern-
ments can commit credibly to a policy, the Eaton-Grossman (1986) policy reversal 
result is not observed in our paper, independent of the nature of market competi-
tion and for all relevant degrees of product differentiation. That is, if we restrict 
out attention to the cases where both firm profits and country welfare are posi-
tive, it is optimal for the governments to subsidize firms. If the government does 
not commit to a policy instrument in the first stage then the Eaton-Grossman 
policy reversal is obtained for all degree of product differentiation. In a simple 
way, investment in cost reducing R&D captures firm investment in sunk costs 
(entry barriers) before it enters an industry (and helps us model firms commit-
ment to a strategic variable prior to the market competition stage). Incorporating 
this feature in the model we see that the policy instrument reversal is no longer 
observed. 
Our results also highlight the fact that market models that abstract from 
product differentiation may not be appropriate for the analysis of optimal trade 
policies when firms invest in cost reduction. We also show that the degree of prod-
uct differentiation is an important determinant of the policy instrument choice. 
This is true for both Cournot and Bertrand competition21 . We see that allowing 
for investment in cost reducing R&D has an important commitment value for 
both the firms. By committing to a level of cost reducing R&D firms are able to 
21 Allowing for no investment in cost reducing innovation, under bilateral output subsidies the 
optimal subsidy, or tax, is positive only if the domestic firm is not a monopoly. 
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affect the price/output choice in the market selection stage. The importance of 
government commitment is further highlighted in our framework. We show that 
policy reversals occur when government policy announcements are not credible. 
However, a credible government will never choose to tax the domestic firm regard-
less of the degree of product differentiation. In all the cases domestic welfare is 
always greater under free trade. 
Further, modelling government no-commitment as a policy choice to be adopted 
unilaterally, or bilaterally, by governments, we show that in fact the dominant 
strategy equilibrium is that no governments adopts the no-commit policy and in-
stead prefers free trade. If a government unilaterally chooses not to commit its 
welfare is lower than under free and decreases further if countries choose not to 
commit bilaterally. Thus, an interesting result coming ont of our paper is that 
in horizontally differentiated industries lack of commitment as a policy action is 
never adopted by governments. 
Results on innovation expenditures under Conrnot and Bertrand competi-
tion are similar to Bester and Petrakis (1993), with firms investing more in cost-
reducing innovation under Cournot than under Bertrand competition. Investment 
in R&D, however, depends on the degree of product differentiation. As the goods 
become closer substitutes, investment in R&D declines. 
Our results further indicate that when both the countries subsidize R&D and 
output a partial policy reversal is obtained moving from Bertrand to Cournot com-
petition. Unlike Eaton and Grossman, where countries tax output under Bertrand 
compet.ition and subsidize output under Cournot, we show that under a system 
of dnal inst.ruments both governments subsidize output and R&D under Bertrand 
competition. However, nnder Cournot competition R&D is taxed and output is 
subsidized. However, it remains to be seen what multiple policy instruments are 
jointly adopted by the two countries as equilibrium strategies (in the same way 
that bilateral subsidies-even though jointly suboptimal-are adopted by both the 
cOlmtries) . 
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